This book explores the paradox of the a ~security dilemmaa (TM) in International Relations, as applied to the post-9/11 context of homeland security.

The book's central argument can be summed up by the following counterintuitive thesis: the more security you have, the more security you will need. It argues that enhancing security does not make terrorism more likely, but rather it raises public expectations and amplifies public outrage after subsequent failures. The book contests that this dilemma will continue to shape American, Canadian and British domestic and international security priorities for decades. In exploring the key policy implications resulting from this, the book highlights the difficulty in finding a solution to this paradox, as the most rational and logical policy options are part of the problem.

This book will be of interest to students of Homeland Security, Security Studies, US politics, and IR in general.

The almost universally accepted explanation for the Iraq War is very clear and consistent - the US decision to attack Saddam Hussein's regime on March 19, 2003 was a product of the ideological agenda, misguided priorities, intentional deceptions and grand strategies of President George W. Bush and prominent 'neoconservatives' and 'unilateralists' on his national security team. Despite the widespread appeal of this version of history, Frank P. Harvey argues that it remains an unsubstantiated assertion and an underdeveloped argument without a logical foundation. His book aims to provide a historically grounded account of the events and strategies which pushed the US-UK coalition towards war. The analysis is based on both factual and counterfactual evidence, combines causal mechanisms derived from multiple levels of analysis and ultimately confirms the role of path dependence and momentum as a much stronger explanation for the sequence of decisions that led to war.

At a time when international relations theory is being criticized for its lack of relevance, this book seeks to uncover theoretical and empirical knowledge about international conflict, crisis and war by exploring and testing new avenues of research. With chapters on enduring rivalries, crisis bargaining, world wars, strategic surprise, defence allocations, war termination and conflict resolution, the contributors collectively develop a stronger foundation for answering pressing questions about the onset, escalation and de-escalation of different forms of international violence from nineteenth century conflict to nuclear crises.

The almost universally accepted explanation for the Iraq War is very clear and consistent - the US decision to attack Saddam Hussein's regime on March 19, 2003 was a product of the ideological agenda, misguided priorities, intentional deceptions and grand strategies of President George W. Bush and prominent 'neoconservatives' and 'unilateralists' on his national security team. Despite the widespread appeal of this version of history, Frank P. Harvey argues that it remains an unsubstantiated assertion and an underdeveloped argument without a logical foundation. His book aims to provide a historically grounded account of the events and strategies which pushed the US-UK coalition towards war. The analysis is based on both factual and counterfactual evidence, combines causal mechanisms derived from multiple levels of analysis and ultimately confirms the role of path dependence and momentum as a much stronger explanation for the sequence of decisions that led to war.

More than ever before, ethnic struggle finds expression in the growing incidence and scale of displaced persons and refugee flows, as well as in exacerbated levels of ethnic minority abuse and involuntary assimilation. Demographic and political sources of instability in multi-ethnic societies assure the continuing significance of ethnic strife and the potential for intrastate ethnic violence far into the next millennium. While not all disagreements between ethnic groups can be expected to escalate into violence, more than a few have produced intractable and destructive conflicts, and one or more of these conflicts could ultimately reach levels that overwhelm international resources and capabilities.

Carment and Harvey examine how regional and international security organizations can prevent destructive ethnic conflict and manage cases in which violence already is at hand. First they develop a conceptual framework for advancing basic research on the prevention and management of intrastate ethnic violence. They evaluate theoretical knowledge about the nature of ethnic conflict, using case material and quantitative assessments, and they apply these assumptions against recent instances of conflict management through an in-depth study of NATO's involvement in Kosovo and Bosnia. This book serves as an important research tool for students, scholars, and policy makers involved with ethnic conflict and international relations.

The editors and contributors to this study examine the future of domestic and foreign relations between Canada, Quebec, and their neighbors in the event of a yes vote on independence. They approach the possible emergence of an independent Quebec nation-state from the perspective of the study of world politics. As they suggest, this is particularly important because ethnic-based secessionist movements throughout the world now challenge our understanding of the supposed stability of the nation state within geographical regions and even the operation of states within global political and economic systems.

They examine the implications of a sovereign Quebec with special reference to ethnic-based secession as a dimension of the emerging post cold war international system. In this context, the possible devolution of Canada is an event of enormous significance not only for North America, but also Europe, Africa, Asia, and the Middle East. Given the evolving literature on minorities at risk, ethnicity, ethnonationalism, and ethnic conflict, the prospect of a sovereign Quebec and the devolution of Canada are possible events that may well define the study of world politics well into the 21st century. This book is an important addition for scholars, researchers, students, and concerned citizens interested in intranational relations and ethnicity and Canadian studies.

Arguing that previous critiques of rational choice and deterrence theory are not convincing, Frank Harvey constructs a new set of empirical tests of rational deterrence theory to illuminate patterns of interaction between rival nuclear powers. He analyses the crisis management techniques used by the United States and the Soviet Union in twenty-eight post-war crises and isolates factors that promote or inhibit escalation of these crises. This "crises"-based data set serves as the basis for identifying patterns of response when one nuclear state is threatened by another. The Future's Back offers new directions for testing that emphasize a more unified approach to theory building and assesses the feasibility of alternative courses of action to prevent escalation of future disputes characterized by nuclear rivalry.